Henry Kissinger famously explained the 'intelligence failure' of Yom Kippur in cultural terms, asserting that Western analysts were unable to understand Arab rationality in 'starting an unwinnable 
On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria co-ordinated a lightening surprise attack against Israel. Though short-lived, it was a war that would change the face of the modern Middle East. Launched at 2.pm on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the Sabbath of Yom Kippur, the momentum of the attack carried Egyptian armoured units several miles east of the Suez Canal. Within just three days the Egyptian military were blocked by Israeli retaliation, yet the initial achievements of the Egyptians marked a symbolic turning point in world history. In retrospect the war marked the first step towards a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that would dramatically alter Egypt's seminal role in the international politics of the Middle East. Moreover, it was a conflict with strikingly international implications, bringing the world's superpowers to the brink of a nuclear confrontation in support of their respective allies and provoking the first global oil crisis in numerous European capitals. Arab states united in an unprecedented manner to impose an oil embargo that would visibly punish the United States for backing Israel. However, the October War and the subsequent escalation of the Crisis, forced the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of the American foreign policy agenda. The war revealed that Israeli reluctance to withdraw from occupied Arab territories could have major strategic consequences for the superpower.
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were forced into the curious position of militarily resupplying their clients during the fighting, whilst simultaneously collaborating on a UN ceasefire proposal to quell the conflict. After Israeli contraventions of the ceasefire, the Soviets responded with a sharp warning that if Israel proceeded to violate the UN agreement, they would take the 'appropriate steps unilaterally.' In response, on the 25 October, the U.S. put their nuclear forces on worldwide alert, a step not taken since the Cuban Missile Crisis over a decade before and arguably, a drastic and dangerous overreaction.
Moreover, they did so without consulting with or informing the British government who were already frustrated with their American ally's handing of the crisis. prior to the war, a range of psychological, organisational and bureaucratic factors (both common to cases of surprise attack and specific to the Israeli intelligence community) inhibited high-quality strategic warning. 5 The historiography that followed offered different schools of thought as to which factors were more important. One wave of literature, building on the findings of Agranat, stressed the role of individuals, noting for example the manipulation of information by Director of Military Intelligence General Zeria 6 and the over-reliance on a recently disclosed single source named Ashraf
Marwan (President Nasser's son-in law) who was allegedly a double agent actually working for Egypt.
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An alternative school, composed mainly of Egyptian sources, emphasised the ingenuity of Egypt's deception plan whilst also expressing surprise that Israel had failed to understand the significance of military preparations in the immediate moments before war. 8 A less politically motivated literature stressed the cognitive challenges common to all surprise attacks and the difficulty of distinguishing between 'signals' and 'noise' in the buildup to war 9 . The most convincing accounts placed specific
Israeli failures in the context of wider psychological obstacles to accurate predictions, highlighting the role of Israeli strategic beliefs and dogmatic reliance on a strategic 'Conception', to which crucial information at the tactical level was subordinated. 10 Shlaim presents a typically 'Western' intelligence failure. The inability to discern the intentions of their adversaries is by now a common, even predictable, assertion in the literature on Anglo-American strategic surprise. The West's technical prowess has reaped more reward in 'observing actions than divining intent,' i.e. accessing the 'secrets' (or capabilities) rather than the 'mysteries' (or intentions) of conflict. 38 Sadat himself intimated that this was a cultural phenomena specific to the West. He said:
'You Americans always use computers to solve geopolitical equations and they always mislead you.'
What you 'forgot', he observed pointedly, was to feed 'psychology' into the computer. 39 The implication is therefore that analysts had a good understanding of Egypt's capabilities, but failed to anticipate war because they fundamentally misread Sadat's intentions.
The discussion that follows will suggest that in fact, the reverse is true. Analysts had a remarkably good strategic understanding of Sadat's intentions. Rather, underestimating Egypt's capability resulted in a failure to take these intentions seriously. Returning to Shlaim's equation, when estimated intent was multiplied by estimated capability; it was the latter rather than the former, which was misunderstood, which consequently resulted in a reduced threat perception. Moreover, cultural preconceptions played a role in this equation, but not quite in the way that Kissinger suggests.
Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic proved remarkably able in penetrating Sadat's mindset and unravelling the 'mystery' of his intentions. They accurately identified that a limited military victory would suffice to achieve Sadat's political goal of regaining Egypt's honour and reclaiming her land, they repeatedly warned that in the absence of successful diplomacy Sadat would have no choice but to embark on war and they empathised with the domestic and military pressures on him to take action.
The real weakness therefore lay not in their assessments of the 'mysteries' but more unusually in their analysis of the 'secret' -Egypt's improved capability.
There was a near unanimous agreement within the Anglo-American intelligence community about Egypt's military bankruptcy. Undoubtedly their assessments mirrored Israeli complacency in this regard. Analysts could be forgiven for asking why they should be worried about Israel if Israel was not worried itself? 40 As the Director for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Ray Cline claimed in a meeting just weeks after war broke out, 'we were brainwashed by the Israelis who brainwashed themselves.' 41 British intelligence veterans have also intimated that Israeli influence was important in this regard. 42 A General in the British Defence Intelligence Staff, shot down the predictions of a young
Colonel that the Egyptians would attack, on the basis that the Israelis insisted that their defences on the Suez Canal were impregnable. 43 Israeli estimations undoubtedly influenced their allies, encouraging them to downgrade their fears of war. 44 As the Franco-Palestinian scholar Camille Mansour puts it, the Israelis were 'seen as the experts, the Considering the limitations of the material available and the extent of US/UK intelligence sharing, the article takes a collaborative approach to Anglo-American intelligence rather than a comparative one, highlighting divergences between assessments that will undoubtedly be subject to future revision as further material is declassified. Michael Goodman's Official History of the Joint Intelligence
Committee describes the growing exchange of assessments and increasingly close relations between the CIA and JIC that characterised the post-war era, notwithstanding differences in policy. 46 Similarly, John Dumbrell observes that together with nuclear information, the 'intimate intermeshing of US and British intelligence … formed the essence and beating heart of the Cold War "special relationship".' 47 Moreover, America had no formal diplomatic relations with Egypt following a political rupture between the two states after the Six-Day War. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the Americans will have relied even more heavily on British diplomatic and intelligence reporting during this period.
Mystery No. 1: Limited Military action
Two years before the 1973 war, the British intelligence community made a strikingly accurate assessment of the key motivating factors that would determine the next Arab-Israeli conflict. The JIC argued that:
Sadat might calculate that the strengthening of Egypt's system of air defence with Russian backing would enable him at any rate to reopen limited military action…without making it certain Egypt would suffer unacceptable casualties and damage through Israeli retaliation. Politically he might be influenced by the hope that such action would relieve him of criticism, internally and elsewhere in the Arab World. He might also hope that it might galvanise the United States into taking action to restore the ceasefire or into bringing greater pressure to bear on Israel in relation to the achievement either of an interim arrangement or a comprehensive settlement.
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Identifying the sufficiency of a limited initiative was an impressive feat. It is a central precept of That a limited military initiative would suffice to achieve Sadat's goal of provoking a political solution was thus amply recognised. Analysts had a number of precedents and public declarations indicating that in the Arab cultural context, absolute military superiority was no precondition to initiating an attack. Ultimately, the decision to go to war would depend on what international diplomacy could (and could not) achieve.
Mystery No 2.: International diplomacy
The quality and timeliness of international diplomacy was therefore recognised to be a fundamental factor in Sadat's calculations. Analysts identified that Sadat regarded military moves as a complement to diplomacy and accurately assessed that he would only embark on war when diplomacy appeared to have failed. Erstwhile Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Hafez Ismail recounted that 'Sadat wanted the heat of the battle to be the force behind the political decisions which had to be taken.' 57 The British intelligence community demonstrated considerable foresight about the consequences of I do not think it is overstating it to say that, unless Israel can be persuaded to show a greater willingness to withdraw from the territories she occupied in 1967, vital Western interests will soon be at risk. In the circumstances I very much hope, Mr President, that you will give the most serious consideration to using the unique influence of the United States with the Israelis to persuade them that they must change their lines -in their ultimate interest as well as ours. 63 It seems clear therefore that analysts communicated the primacy of diplomatic negotiations in Sadat's strategic considerations. They recognised that whilst Sadat hoped that the threat of war could act as sufficient leverage in such negotiations, he was increasingly subject to domestic and military pressures to take military action.
Mystery No. 3. Domestic Pressures
Analysts identified Sadat's fragile domestic position as the final pressure point. It was no secret that Sadat struggled to assert his authority as a statesmanlike successor to Nasser. 64 The CIA initially believed that he was 'a compromise candidate chosen for his weakness' and that he was unlikely to 'fill the presidency for more than an interim period.' 65 In 1971, Sadat faced an internal power struggle with his Nasserist opponents, exposing a plot to overthrow the new President.
More worryingly, Sadat's much-lauded 'year of decision' had resulted in naught. Though less concerned, American analysts also reported Egyptian assertions that the no-war, no peace situation was 'more dangerous for the future of Egypt than war itself.' They judged that such statements were most likely a 'pressure tactic' to evoke a response from the U.S., but concluded that, 'it probably accurately reflects Sadat's feeling that the present situation is both an affront to his personal self-respect and ruinous of national morals, dignity and constructive purpose.' 72 Despite a deteriorating economic situation, American analysts expressed 'doubt' that Sadat was 'under significant domestic pressure to go to war.' They argued that 'Sadat and his advisers are aware that their military prospects are poor at best.' The danger was that 'disaster might well sweep away Sadat's regime than rescue him from his dilemma.' 73 Analysts recognised that Sadat faced unparalleled pressures to wage war. As a weak successor to Nasser, he was seen as particularly vulnerable to pressures from the military and unprecedented public protests. Though they assessed that a military disaster might portend the end of the regime, they accurately gauged the all-encompassing and detrimental impact of the no-war, no-peace situation on Sadat's calculations.
The 'Secret': Underestimating Egyptian capabilities
If British and American analysts were able to gauge Sadat's intentions with a relatively high degree of accuracy, the same cannot be said for their assessments of Egypt's capabilities. As Kissinger put it, 'I have never seen a military estimate by anybody, prior to the war which indicated that the Arabs had any chance whatever of defeating the Israelis or of even staving off their own defeat for anything longer than six days.' 74 The fact that these pilots closed with the enemy when out-numbered showed courage and a press on spirit even if it was suicidal. This type of determination in the face of the enemy has not been noticeable in the past. If this is any guide to the morale of other MIG 21 planes it could be an important change. 79 The JIC also reported some improvements. Whilst acknowledging that the 'relative standards' of training, morale and equipment between Arab and Israeli military forces differed significantly, the Committee nonetheless noted, 'steps taken to weed out unreliable elements' in the army and recognised 'the impact of Soviet equipment and training.' However, the JIC definitively concluded that 'Arab officer cadres will not succeed in the period under review in matching the highly dedicated and professional Israeli commanders in morale or ability' and that this would 'remain the over-riding factor to be set against Arab numerical superiority.' 80 The sheer surety of the statement, with none of the hedging 'mays' or 'mights' for which JIC assessments are typically criticised, demonstrates the extent to which analysts were convinced that Egypt could never achieve anything resembling a military victory against Israel. Why were analysts so sure?
The recently declassified record suggests two overarching factors which influenced and distorted perceptions of Egypt's capabilities: the first was the precedent of 1967 and several cultural conceptions it contributed to forming and reinforcing. The second was the shift in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, which not only lowered the guard of Anglo-American intelligence services but masked regional dynamics in a deceptively simplistic Cold War framework.
Arab political culture and the precedent of 1967
There was an undeniable 'Orientalism' to analytic assessments of Arab military capability. The danger is that, in seeking to restore his [Sadat's] credibility, he will not only convince himself that he must do something but will also create a momentum which he will be unable to check. He also seems to suffer from the dangerous delusion that, if he reopened hostilities on the Canal, he could keep them within acceptable limits pending some action by the Great Powers to bring about cease-fire and diplomatic progress toward a settlement. There is also the danger…that he will repeat the 1967 performance, i.e. he will provoke the Israelis into some form of pre-emptive strike. 87 That Nasser's actions in 1967 had unleashed a Frankenstinian monster born of miscalculation and a dogmatic commitment to 'face' loomed large in the minds of analysts, many of whom were probably the same people in the same posts. 88 They feared that like his predecessor, Sadat was foolishly backing himself into a corner, which would once more put the onus of unrestrained action on Israel.
Implicit in assessments of Sadat's personal and strategic inadequacies was a belief that Arab political culture was not inclined to objectively self-analyse and learn from past mistakes. In a controversial analysis of the 'Arab national character' almost a decade earlier, the CIA reflected that there was,, little evidence that Greek analytical self-critical philosophy ever entered the Near East. The motto 'Know Thyself' is not quoted by the Arabs…The concept of self-examination, whether for purposes of self-management or self-improvement, could not be accepted because of its conflict with the more honoured cultural requirement of blameless dignity. The British Naval Attaché reinforced, that the 'Muslim belief in Allah's Providence and Will' and an 'innate fatalism' enabled the Egyptian people 'to survive a prolonged no-fighting war, but was not particularly conducive to sustained competence under pressure.' 98 Recent research has shown that the British intelligence community was in the habit of emphasising the passivity of other races, but in the Egyptian case Islam seems to have occupied a particular pride of place as a factor inhibiting a competent military performance and strategic capability. 99 The manner in which the underlying religiosity of the Egyptian people could be mobilised to fight a losing battle was evidently misunderstood. If indeed 'Islam' affected the Egyptian response to war, it evoked a widespread readiness to sacrifice life in such a way that was barely comprehensible to the secular political culture of the West. Diplomats were informed that, 'most Egyptians were farmers and even if their sons joined the army they still regarded a decision of war and peace as being of little concern to them since whether their sons or relatives died was a matter entirely preordained by God.'
All levels of society in Egypt shared a 'basic hatred of Israel.' This was 'not merely a national but a religious phenomenon. War would therefore be popular.' 100 The notion of individual sacrifice for the spirit of Egypt alluded to Islamic scriptural metaphors in which the personal defeats of individual men were transformed into collective victories.
There was something of a cultural schism here. Not only would a Western state rarely enter war in the knowledge that they would probably lose on the battlefield but even military victory did not always translate into political gain. In Egypt's recent history, however, the experience had been quite different.
President Nasser had lost on the battlefield in the Suez crisis of 1956 but had reaped enormous political gain and even after a spectacular defeat in 1967, managed to retain the support of the Egyptian public and other Arab states. This was partly a result of Nasser's political acumen but was also facilitated by Copeland) will doubtless inform anybody who will listen that this is another sign that Egypt is cracking under Israeli pressure. Our conclusion is just the opposite.' 101 Sadat himself was more explicitly pious than his predecessor. 102 In a speech to the Al Azhar mosque in 1971, Sadat reminded his listeners that 'Man should not fear anything; for that which befalls him is only what is destined to happen.' 103 The ability of Nasser's more pious successor to appropriate and mobilise this underlying religiosity among Egyptians to translate a military defeat into a political and spiritual victory was thus clearly underestimated.
The final belief about Arab political culture reinforced by the 1967 war was the notion that the rhetoric espoused by Arab political leaders bore little relation to their actual capabilities. In January 1973, the British Naval Attaché reflected on the peculiar relationship between word and fact in Egyptian politics, suggesting that 'the present posture is…a timely demonstration that in Egypt there is a bizarre relation between word and fact; further that fact is a rare commodity that must usually be substituted by deduction and probability.' 104 The CIA had long made a similar analytic observation about the alleged subjectivity of the Arab mind, noting that that 'the facts become what the Arab emotionally wants to believe is true.' 105 The implication was that the words spoken by Arab leaders bore little or no relation to military realities.
Ideas about the misleading nature of Arab rhetoric were reinforced by, or at least reflected in, the work of an anthropologist and Orientalist reviewed by the CIA's in-house journal. 106 In a detailed study of 'the Arab Mind,' Raphael Patai argued that certain discursive features such as mubalagha The psychological impact of more amicable relations between British and Egyptian officers that followed the Soviet expulsion meant important residual Soviet influences would be missed.
As Bar-Joseph has uncovered, Egypt's war planners based their plans on Soviet doctrine, stipulating that a primary way to conceal real preparations for war is to disguise them as an exercise -'maskirova.' The Egyptians sought to convince the Israelis that the information about military preparations they were collecting was connected to 'Tahrir 41,' a large-scale routine crossing exerciseyet another one in a series of similar exercises conducted twice a year since 1968. 114 The secrecy of operations was thereby maintained. Platoon commanders heard that they were to start a real war only six hours before the attack. Similar levels of secrecy were maintained in the Syrian army.' 115 The potential impact of these operational influences was undermined by the physical removal of 
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Only in hindsight was it seen that 'the removal of the restraining hands of the Soviet advisers meant that the Egyptians were now masters of their own house, able to lay their own plans according to their own ideas.' 119 Moreover, it was only after the expulsion that rearmament to the scale desired by Sadat, really began. Nonetheless, weeks before war analysts assessed (with a discernible tone of smugness)
that 'Sadat's experience with the Soviets appears to have taught him a pragmatism that has enabled him to set a course and a pace better suited to Egypt's capabilities.'
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The extent to which the Soviet-Arab dimension blurred assessments is most pertinently illustrated in a CIA memorandum prepared on the morning of the attack, confirming that 'as many as 1000 dependents have left Egypt.' 121 Two plausible interpretations of the Soviet evacuation were put forth.
The first was that the Soviet Union had 'gotten wind' of plans to initiate hostilities and in protest were evacuating dependents and advisors. Analysts concluded that, 'in so far as advisors are included in the evacuation, the effectiveness of an Arab attack is likely to be somewhat downgraded and the risks of Soviet involvement will lessen.' 122 The second interpretation and the one that, revealingly, was more 'in favour with the intelligence services' was that the remaining Soviet advisors were 'being expelled from both Egypt and Syria.' Into this assessment were incorporated considerations of the regional, inter-Arab dimension; specifically, 128 Yet a detailed examination of the archival record shows that the issue was not overlooking 'psychology' -far from it, the analysis of the central intelligence bodies in both Britain and America demonstrated a conceptual and applied understanding of this dimension. They appreciated the importance of a limited military victory to regain 'honour', the significance of international diplomacy and the domestic context upon which Sadat's decision-making would depend.
The declassified record indicates particularly astute assessments of Sadat's 'mindset' by British analysts. Britain's more accentuated policy interests in the region appear to have influenced the rigour and sensitivity of their assessments. That the onus of action was on the U.S. rather than the U.K. may also provide some explanation -it is always easier to criticise or stress the need for action when the obligation to act lies on another party. It is likely that the closer diplomatic relations between Egypt and
Britain that characterised the post-1967 period (in contrast to the lack of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the U.S. until after the Yom Kippur war) enabled more sensitive and comprehensive diplomatic reporting on the part of British analysts.
Though Sadat's intentions were broadly well understood, it seems clear that analysts failed to take his intentions seriously because they doubted his ability to carry out his goals. In effect the result was the same -an erroneously reduced perception of threat. There is a double irony to this underestimation of Egypt's capability. Beliefs about the specificity of Arab political culture were a major contributing factor to analytical strengths in reading Sadat's intentions in 1973, yet similar cultural beliefs culminated in a fundamental misreading of Egypt's military capabilities. The second irony surrounds assessments of the Soviet role in the crisis. In the years that Soviet influence was most pronounced in Egypt, analysts were uncannily conscious of the need to resist interpreting developments exclusively through the prism of the Cold War, rightly stressing the importance of regional dynamics. 129 After the Soviet expulsion however, analysts regressed to a simplistic assessment of Egypt's capabilities through a misleadingly basic Cold War framework: that without the Soviet backing, Egypt stood no chance of military success.
This dual underestimation of Egypt's capability by Anglo-American analysts also accentuates the psychological primacy of intelligence analysis -particularly the power of stated and unstated preconceptions in masking even the 'facts' i.e. the 'secrets' of a nation's capability. As one seasoned scholar of strategic surprise puts it, 'avoiding intelligence failures requires the elimination of strategic preconceptions,' but at the same time, as humans, 'we cannot operate without some preconceptions.' 130 In the case of 1973, this problem was even more acute because the cultural preconceptions with which the intelligence community had faced the Arab World in the decade before had been substantiated as accurate in, for example, the analytical 'success' of 1967. 131 This instance of 'failure' is thus considerably more complicated and certainly less absolute than some of the historiography has hitherto suggested. Clearly there were analytical pitfalls that drew heavily on Orientalist beliefs about the 'otherness' of the Arab mind. However, this appears to have been more prevalent in assessments of Egypt's capabilities than her intentions. To dismiss the political and intelligence community as having 'failed' to understand Sadat's intentions, as the historiography does, is to misrepresent the role of these perceptions in their historical context. That war was not anticipated in October 1973 was not the result of an inability to understand the motivations of a leader in crisis, for which intelligence is often criticised, but rather a rarer failure to recognise an altered capability.
Nor was this an exclusively Western misconception. As Heikal and numerous others have indicated, no one was more surprised by Egypt's military achievements early in the conflict than Sadat himself. 133 To this day, it is impossible to know whether the 'signals' and 'noise' problem that analysts faced with 
